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Abstract 
Using data from what was once one of the world’s largest capture fisheries the 
economic value of a marine reserve is calculated using a stochastic optimal control 
model with a jump diffusion process. The results show that with a stochastic 
environment an optimal-sized marine reserve can generate a triple payoff that (a), 
raises the resource rent even when harvesting is ‘optimal’, (b) decreases the recovery 
time for the biomass to return to its former state and smooths fishers’ harvests and 
resource rents, and (c), lowers the chance of a catastrophic collapse following a 
negative shock. 
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Abstract 
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value of a marine reserve is calculated using a stochastic optimal control model with a jump-
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marine reserve can generate a triple payoff that (a), raises the resource rent even when 
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Many catastrophes have occurred in fisheries around the planet …, but none is more 
devastating as the closing of the fish banks from Cape Cod to Newfoundland along the 
northeast coast of North America. 
Michael Berrill (1997), p. 114. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Capture fisheries face problems of both biological and economic overfishing and many 
stocks are in decline (Malakoff, 1997; Schiermeier, 2002). For the period 1974-1999, the 
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) calculates that the proportion of fisheries 
harvested beyond the estimated maximum yield tripled from around 10% to 30% of surveyed 
stocks (FAO, 2000) while Myers and Worm (2003) estimate that the stocks of predatory fish 
in the world’s oceans have declined by over 90% in the past 50 years. In Europe, several cod 
stocks have declined precipitously in the previous two decades and some important stocks are 
at their lowest levels ever (European Environment Agency, 2003). 
To overcome excess fishing both managers and scientists have argued for a more holistic 
approach to management and the greater use of marine reserves (Botsford et al., 1997; Pauly 
et al., 2002). Reserves are justified on theoretical grounds because they can increase yields 
when population levels are overexploited (Pezzey et al., 2000; Sanchirico and Wilen, 2001), 
reduce the variance of the population (Conrad, 1999) and harvest (Sladek Nowlis and 
Roberts, 1998; Mangel, 2000; Hannesson, 2002) and provide a ‘hedge’ against management 
failure (Lauck et al., 1998). Empirical studies of reserves also indicate that they can raise the 
spawning biomass and mean size of exploited populations (Gell and Roberts, 2002), increase 
abundance (Côté, Mosquiera and Reynolds, 2001) and, relative to reference sites, raise 
population density, biomass, fish size and diversity (Halpern, 2003). Reserves have also been 
shown to generate positive spillovers to fishers in adjacent areas subject to harvesting 
(Roberts et al., 2001; Bhat, 2003; Gell and Roberts, 2003).  
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Despite the apparent benefits of marine reserves, they remain a controversial management 
tool and measures to establish or enlarge reserves are often met with protest by fishers 
(National Research Council, 2001). Indeed, many fishers are strongly opposed to all but the 
smallest ‘no-take’ areas (Halpern and Warner, 2003). The concern is that reserves will reduce 
their harvests, increase costs and restrict when and where they can go fishing. The reluctance 
of harvesters to support reserves has also found some support in the economics literature 
which has used deterministic models to show that if effort (and harvests) can be perfectly 
controlled then reserves are of little or no value (Holland and Brazee, 1996), reserves need to 
be in the order of 70-80% of a fishing area to generate yield and conservation benefits to 
fishers equivalent to optimal harvesting (Hannesson, 1998), and that reserves can increase 
sustainable yields and revenues only when the population is overexploited (Holland, 2000; 
Pezzey et al., 2000).  
To address the question of what is the economic value of marine reserves, and how they 
might assist in preventing declines or collapses in fish populations, we use data and estimates 
from what was once one of the world’s largest capture fisheries ― the northern cod fishery of 
Newfoundland and Labrador. This resource has been commercially exploited for centuries 
and, until the 1950s, fish were found in such large numbers that harvesting was considered to 
have no material impact on yields (Berrill, 1997).  Beginning with the arrival of the first 
freezer-factory trawler in 1958, however, harvesting grew dramatically reaching a peak of 
over 800,000 tons in 1968. Despite extension of Canadian fisheries jurisdiction over most of 
the fishing grounds in 1977, coupled with the use of input and total harvest controls, the 
fishery collapsed in the early 1990s and still has yet to recover. 
Using data from the fishery we address four principal questions: what would have been 
the economic value of a marine reserve if a ‘no-take’ harvesting area of optimal size had been 
established in the fishery in 1962? Even with ‘optimal’ harvesting that tries to maximize the 
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discounted net returns from fishing, is it possible for a marine reserve to generate an extra 
economic return to harvesters given the shocks that occurred in the fishery? What is the 
consequence for optimal reserve size of harvesting from a smaller than optimal biomass? 
Could an economically optimal marine reserve have prevented the collapse of the fishery if 
the harvesting rule used by the regulator had been successfully implemented? The answers we 
provide generate important insights for the management of renewable resources. 
 
2. The Mismanagement and Collapse of Fisheries 
 
Many of the world’s exploited fisheries are managed on the presumption that maximizing 
the sustainable yield from the fishery is both possible and desirable. In reality, there exists a 
wealth of evidence that fisheries are subject to environmental stochasticity, where populations 
can widely fluctuate over time (Caddy and Gulland, 1983), and variability that can hide 
evidence of overexploitation (Ludwig et al., 1993). For example, the world’s largest fishery 
ever in terms of harvests was the Peruvian anchoveta that, according to official statistics, had 
total catches peak at an unsustainable 12 million tons, but which suddenly collapsed following 
an El Niňo event in 1972-73. Various reasons have been given for the collapse, but 
undoubtedly overharvesting was a major contributing factor, despite controls on the total 
harvest (Pauly et al., 2002). A similar story occurred with the North Sea herring fishery that 
had yielded harvests of between 300,000 and 1 million tons/year in the first half of the 
twentieth century, but also collapsed in the early 1970s because of over harvesting that was, 
in part, a consequence of overestimation of the size of the population by fishery biologists 
(Hilborn and Walters, 1992). More recently, half of the major cod stocks in Europe have 
fallen below a critical biomass thresholds where recruitment is expected to decline and the 
risk of collapse is greatly increased (European Environment Agency, 2003). 
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One of the most recent and also most spectacular collapses of any fishery has been the 
catastrophic decline in the population of Canada’s northern cod fishery. Indeed, the collapse 
has been so profound that the sub-species of cod in the fishery has been listed by the 
independent Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife (COSEWIC) as endangered 
(Schiermeier, 2003). This is despite the fact that the northern cod fishery has been 
commercially exploited since 1497 and consistently yielded annual catches of more than 
200,000 tons per year over the period 1880 to 1960 (Hannesson, 1996).  
The decline began with the arrival of large factory stern trawlers in the late 1950s when 
the exploitation rate increased dramatically as these vessels were able to harvest cod offshore 
in winter months at times and at places where they were never previously caught. As shown 
in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1, by 1968 harvests peaked at the unsustainable level of over 
800,000 tons and both the biomass and the harvest declined until 1977 when Canada assumed 
jurisdiction for almost the entire area of the fishery. Under Canadian jurisdiction, the total 
allowable harvest was reduced to 173,000 tons on the expectation that stocks would recover 
and eventually allow a sustainable yield of over 400,000 tons/year (Department of Fisheries 
and Oceans, 1981). Although stocks did recover and peaked in 1984, the increase was not as 
much as expected. Despite a declining biomass over the 1980s total catches did not decrease 
and reached a maximum of 269,000 tons in 1988. Thereafter, both catches and the biomass 
fell precipitously such that by 1992 a complete harvesting moratorium was imposed on the 
fishery.  
From 1998 onwards a very small amount of fishing was permitted which peaked at 8,000 
tons in 1999 dropping to 1,000 tons in 2003. Since April 2003 the fishery has been closed 
indefinitely and still has not recovered, indeed, its estimated biomass remains at 1% or less of 
its depleted size in the 1980s (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2004a). Based on the 
available evidence, it would seem that the fishery has suffered serious harm that has led to a 
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profound shift in the food web (Scheffer et al., 2001) and may have left the fishery in a 
‘predator pit’ that prevents recovery (Shelton and Healey, 1999). 
 
3. Modeling a Marine Reserve for the Northern Cod Fishery 
 
Many authors have attempted to model the northern cod fishery, but very few have 
examined the issue of optimal harvesting from an economic perspective, or in terms of a 
marine reserve. Grafton et al. (2000) derive a deterministic optimal feedback rule for the 
fishery over the period 1962-1991 and show that such a rule would have led to much smaller 
harvests and the implementation of a harvesting moratorium three years earlier given the 
development of the biomass that actually took place over the period. Guénette et al. (2000) 
derive a spatial model of a marine reserve for the fishery and undertake simulations for the 
period 1984-1991 to compare the ability of a reserve to protect the fishery from collapse with 
no other management controls, with seasonal closures for trawl and gillnets, and with winter 
season trawl closures. They find that a reserve of 80% size would have been sufficient to 
prevent the collapse that occurred in the early 1990s. Unfortunately, the model they use lacks 
an economic component and they are unable to determine optimal harvest, an economically 
optimal reserve size or consider the implications of a harvest rule on the fishery. Moreover the 
data they use, and also in their simulations, do not include the period 1973 when a large 
negative shock struck the fishery. 
 Following Grafton et al. (2000) we estimate a generalised density dependent growth 
function for the northern cod fishery of the following form:  
 ( ) (1 )xf x rx
K
α= −  (1) 
where x  is the population or biomass, ( )f x  is its growth, r is the intrinsic growth rate, α is a 
parameter and K is the carrying capacity. Using two different estimates of carrying capacity of 
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3.2 million (Grafton et al. 2000) and 5.6 million (Guénette et al., 2000), and data for actual 
harvests and estimated exploitable biomass for the period 1962-1992, we estimate parameter 
values for (1) with a dummy variable for 1973. The estimates (with standard errors in 
parentheses) for the case where K = 3.2 million are r = 0.27067 (0.03670), α  = 0.24869 
(0.12339) and D73 = -0.3043 (0.10928) and where K = 5.6 million are r = 0.27734 (0.04756), 
α  = 0.65602 (0.37303) and D73 = -0.30132 (0.11147).1 . Both sets of estimates are used in 
determining optimal harvest and optimal reserve size in our simulations and provide similar 
results. 
In our modeling, we test for the significance of environmental shocks over the 30-year 
period and find that the only year when a dummy variable is significantly different from zero 
at the 5 percent level of significance is 1973. In addition to testing for negative shocks in (1) 
using dummy variables, we also apply an index approach of absolute dissimilarity (Diewert, 
2002). This method, extended by Fox et al. (2004), allows us to calculate mix, scale and 
absolute measures of dissimilarity. We find that the decline in the growth in the biomass in 
1973 is a clear outlier that generates a mix score of 7.00 while the next highest score in any 
year is just 0.71.2
In the case of a permanent reserve that protects proportion (0,1]s∈  of the population, the 
carrying capacity in the harvested or exploited area is defined by (1 )s K− . Thus, with a 
reserve, the growth functions of the population in and outside of the reserve are defined by  
 ( , ) (1 )RR R
xf x s rx
sK
α= −  (2) 
 ( , ) (1 )
(1 )
NR
NR NR
xf x s rx
s K
α= − −  (3) 
where Rx  and NRx  are the population of fish in and outside of the reserve.  
The inter-temporal rent from harvesting in the northern cod fishery is defined by  
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 ( , ) ( ) ( , )
(1 )
NR
NR
xh x p h h c h
s K
Π = − −  (4) 
where h is harvest, ( )p h  is the inverse demand function and ( , )
(1 )
NRxc h
s K−  is the aggregate 
cost function. The inverse demand is defined as ( )p h ahε= and the cost function by 
(1 )( , )
(1 )
NR
NR
x bh s Kc h
s K x
−=− . Both functions are derived from Grafton et al. (2000) where a 
and b are estimated to be 0.35 and 0.2 and ε  is –0.3. 
To analyze the effects of the marine reserve in the northern cod fishery we incorporate 
environmental instability as two types of stochasticity: one, environmental stochasticity that 
may be either a positive or negative due to temporal variation in the habitat (Shaffer, 1981) 
and, two, a negative shock that occurs randomly over time. We define environmental 
stochasticity by a Wiener diffusion process (Brownian motion) that follows a normal 
distribution ( ) and negative shocks as a jump process ( ) that follows a Poisson 
distribution defined by the parameter 
tW q
λ . 
We identify only one significant negative shock on the biomass that occurs in 1973 ― 
equivalent to about 30% reduction of the total biomass for that year. Thus in our simulations 
we incorporate the actual shock in 1973 and set λ  sufficiently large to ensure no further 
shock occurs over the period 1974-1991. In other words, our estimates indicate that the severe 
declines in the exploitable biomass in the late 1980s and early 1990s can be entirely explained 
by over harvesting without reference to negative environmental shocks — a result consistent 
with the findings of both Hutchings and Myers (1994) and Myers et al. (1996). 
The optimization problem maximizes the discounted net returns in the northern cod 
fishery over the period 1962-1991 taking into account both environmental stochasticity and 
the negative shock that occurred in 1973. The solution provides a ‘counterfactual’ of what the 
optimal harvest and optimal reserve size should have been in the northern cod fishery if the 
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objective of the regulator had been to maximize the discounted net returns from fishing. The 
structure of this model is defined below. 
  (5) 
0
( , ) max ( , , )tR NR h NRV x x e h x s dt
ρ
∞
−= Π∫
subject to: 
 [ ( , ) (1 ) ( )] ( ) ( )
(1 )
NRR
R R R R
xxdx f x s s K dt g x dW x dq
sK s K
φ ψ= − − − + +−  (6) 
 [ ( , ) (1 ) ( ) ] ( ) ( )
(1 )
NRR
NR NR NR NR
xxdx f x s s K h dt g x dW x dq
sK s K
φ γ= + − − − + +−  (7) 
 0 (0)x x=  (8). 
We define ρ  as the discount rate set equal to 0.05, the initial population ( 0x ) as the sum of 
the population in and outside of the reserve in 1962 and equal to 2.96 million tons, and 
(1 ) ( )
(1 )
NRR xxs K
sK s K
φ − − − as the transfer function that governs migration from the reserve to 
the exploited areas of the habitat. The transfer function is consistent with existing diffusion 
models in fisheries (Kramer and Chapman, 1999) where migration between the reserve and 
exploited populations depends on relative population densities. A higher density promotes out 
migration, but for a given difference in density, the larger is the reserve the smaller is the 
transfer (Beverton and Holt, 1957). We specify a value for φ  that corresponds to a migration 
level of about 5% of the reserve population in the absence of a negative shock, and about 25% 
immediately following the negative shock.  
Environmental stochasticity is represented by ( ) 0.05R Rg x x=  and  which 
implies that both the reserve and fishery are subject to 5% variation following a realization of  
dW that is either +1 or –1 and that occurs with equal probability. The functions 
( ) 0.05NR NRg x x=
ψ  and γ  
represent shock sensitivities in the reserve and fishery. They differ to allow for the possibility 
that harvesting, especially trawling in offshore areas in the winter months, may have had a 
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deleterious impact on the age structure and habitat (Turner et al., 1999) such that, for a given 
negative shock, the consequences are greater for the exploited than the reserve population. 
However, we also examine the case where the shock sensitivities are the same for the reserve 
and harvested population. In our specification, we impose only the negative shock that 
actually occurred in the fishery in 1973 and examine two cases: one, ( ) 0.0Rxψ =  and 
( ) 0.30403NR NRx xγ = −  and, two, ( ) 0.30403R Rx xψ = −  and ( ) 0.30403NR NRx xγ = − . In the first 
case, the negative shock is assumed not to occur in the reserve while in the second it occurs 
equally in both the reserve and fishery.  
We use Ito’s Lemma to define Bellman’s fundamental equation of optimality, given by 
equation (9), to solve for the optimal harvest trajectory for a given reserve size, i.e., 
 
 
2 2
(1 )( , , ) ( )[ ( , ) ( ) ]
(1 )( )[ ( , ) ( )]
( , ) max
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
[ ( ( ), ( )) ( )]
NR
R
R R NR NR R NR
NRR
NR x NR
NRR
x R
R NR h
x x R x x NR x x R NR
R R NR NR
xx sh x s V x f x s h
sK K
xx sV x f x s
V x x sK K
V g x V g x V g x g x
V x x x x V x
φ
φρ
λ ψ γ
−Π + + − −
−+ − − +=
+ +
+ + −
+
(9) 
 
where the optimal harvest is determined from all possible reserve sizes to maximize an overall 
value function, defined by , for a given stochastic realization ( and ). ( , )R NRV x x
∗ dq dW
To solve (9) for the optimal reserve size and harvest trajectory we use a modified form of 
the perturbation method introduced by Gaspar and Judd (1997) and Judd (1999). The method 
involves introducing two auxiliary variables (one for the diffusion process and another for the 
jump process) to the Bellman equation. Following the substitution, for a given , a second-
order Taylor series expansion can be defined around the steady state in the deterministic case. 
In the first step of the algorithm the steady state is found by using the maximum condition for 
s
 10
the Bellman equation, applying the Envelope Theorem and also the equations of motion for 
the reserve and non-reserve populations. In the second step, we differentiate the maximum 
condition and Envelope theorem equation with respect to the state variables Rx  and NRx . 
Successive differentiation of the Bellman equation with respect to the auxiliary variables, 
control variables and state variables was automated using MAPLE to calculate the partial 
derivatives of the optimal value function and control variables with respect to the state and the 
auxiliary variables. This method allows us to solve for the optimal harvest level and the 
reserve size that maximizes the overall value function.  
 
4. The Value of a Marine Reserve 
 
The perturbation method provides a solution to the optimal harvesting and optimal reserve 
size problem for the northern cod fishery. The optimum biomass and harvest levels for all 
years over the period 1962-1991 are provided in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 using the 
estimated parameter values where K = 3.2 million with a 5% discount rate. The results 
indicate that a harvest level of about 400,000 tons/year, obtained from a fluctuating 
exploitable biomass of about 2.5 million tons, would maximize the discounted net returns 
from fishing.  
We find that even with ‘optimal’ harvesting, it is beneficial to have a marine reserve that 
protects about 40% of the total population, given a shock sensitivity of zero in the reserve. We 
emphasize that a reserve is not only beneficial to fishers relative to the actual harvesting that 
took place in the fishery, but would still have generated a positive economic payoff even if 
harvesting had been optimal as defined by the solution to problem given by equations (5)-(8). 
Where the fishery and the reserve have identical shock sensitivities, that is, 
( ) 0.30403R Rx xψ = −  and ( ) 0.30403NR NRx xγ = − , then the optimal reserve size is 10%.  We 
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emphasize that in both cases (equal and different shocks in reserve and fishery) a marine 
reserve generates an economic payoff to fishers even with optimal harvesting.3
 
4.1 Optimal harvest and reserve size versus actual harvest 
 
The value of a marine reserve with optimal harvesting is that it allows the fishery to 
recover faster following the large negative shock in 1973, thereby increasing the harvest over 
what it would have been without a reserve. The trade-off is that in the absence of the shock a 
reserve reduces the harvest over what would be possible with optimal harvesting. Thus, when 
an unexpected negative shock occurs a reserve generates a positive economic benefit in that it 
allows for the spillover of fish out of the reserve and raises the harvest available to fishers. 
This spillover effect is shown in Figure 1 where a 40% reserve generates a much higher level 
of harvest than no reserve immediately following, and for several years after, the negative 
shock in 1973 despite the fact that in both cases (40% reserve and no reserve) harvesting is 
‘optimal’. The trade off is that before the shock occurs in 1973 a reserve results in a lower 
harvest than what would have occurred if harvesting had been optimal, but with no reserve. 
This is also illustrated in Figure 1, as is the gradual decline in the extra harvest with a reserve 
following the shock in 1973. 
The economic payoff from a reserve represents a resilience effect that allows for a quicker 
recovery of the population following a negative shock. The more frequent and the larger is the 
shock, the greater is the payoff of a reserve because it acts like a ‘buffer stock’ allowing the 
population to recover faster. Similarly, the smaller the discount rate the more valuable is a 
reserve because the more highly valued are future net returns from increased harvests 
following a shock.  
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The actual harvest in the fishery and optimal harvest with a 40% reserve is plotted in 
Figure 2. From 1964-1970 actual exceeds the optimal harvest and thereafter, with the 
exception of the years 1972-1973 and 1975, optimal harvest is greater than actual harvest. 
Table 1 shows that even with optimal harvesting and a 40% reserve it pays to draw down the 
biomass from its initial level of almost 3 million tons to a desired level of about 2.5 million 
tons and, thereafter, adjust the harvest in response to environmental stochasticity and the 
negative shock in 1973, to return to this level. By contrast, the actual harvest pattern indicates 
there was a major draw down of the biomass, hastened by the negative shock in 1973, until 
the biomass levels out in 1976. The advent of Canadian jurisdiction in 1977 coincides with a 
lower harvest level and a gradual rebuilding of the fishery until 1984, thereafter, as shown in 
Figure 2, unsustainable harvests bring about the collapse of the stock by the end of 1991.  
The cumulative difference between the optimal and actual harvest over the entire period 
1962-1991 is illustrated in Figure 3. It shows that by 1982 optimal harvesting and a 40% 
reserve is able to generate a higher cumulative harvest than what actually took place in the 
fishery. By 1991, the extra landings of fish associated with an optimal harvest and marine 
reserve exceed 1.5 million tons ― an amount that would be expected to continue to increase 
beyond 1991 without a collapse in the fishery.  
The cumulative resource rent from optimal harvesting and a reserve, relative to the actual 
harvest, can be calculated using the estimated inverse demand and cost function for the 
fishery. This extra payoff  for each year is presented in column (1) of Table 2 and illustrated 
in Figure 4. We find that optimal harvesting and an optimal marine size that protects 40% of 
the population would have generated almost $2 billion more in net returns than what actually 
occurred over the 1962-1991 period.4 Although this is a very large economic benefit, it 
grossly underestimates the payoff from optimal harvesting and a reserve because any resource 
rent beyond 1991 is not included in the calculation. Our value also does not account for the 
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$3.9 billion spent by the Government of Canada over the period 1992-2001 to provide income 
support and industry adjustment following the harvesting moratorium in 1992 (Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans, 2004b). Moreover, the payoff from optimal harvesting and a reserve 
assigns no value to the ecosystem benefits associated with a viable northern cod fishery, nor 
does it include the social and economic costs of a harvesting moratorium on fishers, 
processing workers, families and fishing communities over and above any compensation they 
may have received from the Government of Canada. 
The economic payoff associated with a marine reserve versus no marine reserve, but with 
optimal harvesting, is given in column (2) of Table 2. It shows that even with ‘optimal’ 
harvesting a marine reserve generates a cumulative resource rent of $162 million. The extra 
return from a reserve with optimal harvesting occurs because of the large negative shock in 
the fishery in 1973. A reserve would have helped buffer the fishery from the shock via 
spillovers of fish to the harvested area and, thus, allowed for a higher harvest level and 
resource rent than would otherwise have occurred. This payoff, however, would have declined 
over time as no statistically significant negative shocks occurred over the period 1974-1991, 
but if there had been, the value of the reserve would have increased because of its ability to 
raise the harvest level immediately following such shocks.  
 
4.2 Optimal harvest and reserve size versus 20% harvest rule 
 
Our results show the economic benefits of both optimal harvesting and a reserve of 
optimal size combined would have generated multi-billion dollar benefits for the northern cod 
fishery over the period 1962-1991. We now investigate what is the value of a reserve with 
optimal harvesting relative to an approximation of the harvesting rule that was supposed to 
have been used by the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans over the period 1977-
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1991. This is a so-called 20% harvesting rule whereby the current harvest is set at 20% of the 
previous level of the exploitable biomass and approximates the F0.1-rule  (Hannesson, 1996, p. 
93) commonly applied in developed fisheries.  
Unfortunately, the 20% or F0.1-rule that corresponds to a harvest slightly below the 
maximum yield per recruit was not properly applied in northern cod fishery for two reasons. 
First, fisheries biologists overestimated the size of the exploitable biomass and thus the 
harvest rate was actually a much higher rate than intended (Lane and Palsson, 1996).5 Second, 
successive federal fisheries ministers were unwilling to lower harvests due to worries over the 
social and economic costs of lower catches on fishing communities (Charles, 1995). 
Immediate socio-economic concerns associated with lower harvests are not unique to Canada. 
In Europe, for instance, a harvesting moratorium for the North Sea cod has been supported by 
the Scientific, Technical, Economic Committee on Fisheries since 2002, but harvesting is still 
allowed, albeit at reduced levels, because of the negative economic and social impacts of 
closures on the fishing industry (European Environment Agency, 2004). 
A comparison of the extra resource rent associated with optimal harvesting and an optimal 
reserve size versus a 20% harvesting rule and no reserve is given in column (3) of Table 2. 
The results indicate that even if the fishery regulator had been able to successfully implement 
its desired harvesting rule, it would still have generated over $650 million less than what 
could have been obtained with optimal harvesting and a reserve size of 40%. This difference 
is illustrated in Figure 5. Column (4) of Table 2 shows that if a 20% harvesting rule and also a 
40% reserve size had been implemented then the net returns from harvesting would have been 
higher than with the 20% harvesting rule and no reserve — but still some $280 million less 
than a 40% reserve with optimal harvesting .  
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4.3 20% harvest rule versus actual harvest 
 
We can also investigate the economic payoff associated with successfully implementing 
the 20% harvesting rule versus the actual harvest over the period 1962-1991. Column (5) of 
Table 2 shows that the 20% harvest rule offers a very substantial benefit, relative to actual 
harvest, of over $1.2 billion for the period 1962-1991. As shown in column (6) of Table 2, 
however, a marine reserve coupled with the 20% harvesting rule generates an even greater 
payoff. The extra benefit in terms of cumulative resource rent from a reserve with a 20% 
harvesting rule is given in column (7) of Table 2 ― $374 million — and is more than twice as 
much as the extra benefit from having a reserve, but with optimal harvesting. In other words, 
the smaller the actual  biomass is relative to its optimal level, the larger is the economic 
payoff of a reserve.  Thus although a marine reserve gives a positive payoff with optimal 
harvesting, it gives an even higher payoff if a sub-optimal harvesting rule is used, and would 
have given an even greater payoff with the development of the biomass that actually took 
place over the period 1962-1991. 
 
4.4 Sensitivity analysis 
 
A problem with determining optimal reserve size is that the estimates of the economic and 
biological parameters may not be accurate representations of their true values. To examine the 
implications of changes in the economic parameters a and b on the results, we separately 
increased the value of each by 10%. The net effect of increasing a (the demand parameter) by 
10% is to increase the economic value from having optimal harvesting and an optimal reserve 
size by some 12%, while raising  b (the cost parameter) by 10% reduces the economic payoff 
by about 2%.  
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We also undertook a sensitivity analysis by changing the intrinsic growth rate ( ) and the 
transfer coefficient (
r
φ ). The upper and lower values for  in Table 3 represent the point 
estimate for the intrinsic growth rate of 0.27067 plus and minus 0.04, a value that exceeds its 
standard error of 0.0367. The lowest value for 
r
0.7φ =  in Table 3 corresponds to a very low 
transfer, equivalent to about 2% of the reserve population in the absence of a negative shock, 
while the upper value of 1.0φ =  represents a transfer of a little less than 5% of the reserve 
population. Further increases in φ  beyond 1.0 would raise both the optimal reserve size and 
the economic payoff of a reserve.  
In columns 1-4 of Table 3 under the heading optimum reserve size we find that the 
optimum reserve size is sensitive to both  and r φ . This suggests that resource managers need 
to pay careful attention to estimating these key parameters. In columns 5-8 of Table 3, under 
the heading discounted net gain with optimum harvest and reserve size, we find that the net 
economic benefit associated with optimal harvesting with a reserve, relative to the harvesting 
that actually occurred, is robust to changes in φ .  The net gains from having a 40% reserve, 
but with optimal harvesting, are given in columns 8-12 of Table 3. Overall, the sensitivity 
analysis shows that for a wide range of parameter values there exists a large economic payoff 
to a marine reserve, whether harvesting is optimal or whether the comparison is made to the 
actual harvest that occurred over the period 1962-1991.   
 
4.5 Resilience 
 
Several authors have shown that a marine reserve creates resilience in the sense that it 
increases population persistence by raising its level above the minimum viable level 
(Apostolaki et al., 2002; Guénette et al., 1998; Lauck et al., 1998). In our modeling we show 
that reserves also generate two other types of resilience: one, ‘Pimm-resilience’ or P-
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resilience (Pimm, 1984) such that a reserve reduces the time it takes for a harvested 
population to recover to its former state following a negative shock and, two, a ‘Holling-
resilience’ (Holling, 1973) or H-resilience such that a reserve helps the population stay within 
a stable attractor following a shock.  
P-resilience is the reason why a reserve generates an economic payoff with environmental 
stochasticity, even when harvesting is ‘optimal’. It also explains a result by Conrad (1999) 
that with environmental instability a marine reserve reduces the variance of the population. 
Our model shows that if P-resilience is measured as the time it takes for the population to 
recover to within one standard deviation of its former level before a negative shock, then 
recovery time is monotonically decreasing in reserve size. It implies that apart from an 
increased resource rent that a reserve can generate, a reserve can also reduce the variation in 
the rent and that may also be valued by fishers.  
H-resilience is more difficult to quantify because we must show that the population can be 
maintained in its present (but fluctuating) state indefinitely following a negative shock.  
Nevertheless, in Figure 6 we can illustrate the effects of three possible management scenarios 
― optimal harvesting with a 40% reserve, the 20% harvest rule with a 40% reserve and the 
actual harvest ― on the level of the biomass in the northern cod fishery. The actual harvest 
case results in the complete collapse of the fishery by 1992 while both optimal harvesting and 
the 20% harvesting rule with a marine reserve allow the fishery to recover from the 1973 
shock. A reserve also helps keeps the biomass at higher levels than would otherwise be the 
case and, thereby, reduces the risk of the fishery dropping below a threshold point from which 
the stock may not recover.6
Our results do not imply that a reserve is a guarantee against population collapse, but do 
suggest that an optimally sized reserve can reduce the chance of such an event. At least for the 
northern cod fishery, it appears there exists some threshold biomass level beyond which the 
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fishery collapses and may not recover. This implies (a) a marine reserve, apart from the 
economic benefits it generates for fishers, also provides a higher level of the biomass and a 
buffer to negative shocks that gives a degree of protection from crossing a critical threshold 
and (b) when specifying reserve size it is important to ensure a minimum number or biomass 
of fish in the reserve, irrespective of the proportion of the total biomass or population in a 
reserve. 
 
5. Caveats and Implications 
 
Several caveats must be noted in terms of applying our results. First, we do not use an 
explicit spatial model and thus cannot translate the results into defined areas of the habitat, 
nor can we explicitly consider the spatial redistribution of fishing effort with a reserve (Smith 
and Wilen, 2003; Wilen et al., 2002; Wilen 2004). Nevertheless, we may speculate that 
closure of fishing areas offshore, previously de facto reserves until the late 1950s, would be 
an obvious choice for at least part of a reserve. The experience from America’s Georges Bank 
over the period 1994-1998 also indicates that a large offshore reserve may be easier to enforce 
than smaller seasonal areas and can also generate a high level of compliance (Murawski et al., 
2000). Second, the optimal size of the reserve and optimal harvest levels depend on the 
parameters used in our simulations, although our general conclusion of the positive economic 
benefits of a reserve is robust to changes in both economic and biological parameters. 
Our results have a number of important management implications for renewable 
resources. First, and foremost, we find that managing a resource subject to environmental 
instability requires much more than adopting either a ‘conservative’ harvest level or improved 
estimates of the relevant biological and economic parameters (Shelton and Rice, 2002). By 
contrast to traditional management approaches, a reserve provides protection against 
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management failure (Lauck et al., 1998), and also promotes population persistence, P-
resilience and H-resilience. Indeed, on the basis of our simulations, a reserve with optimal 
harvesting would have allowed the northern cod fishery to recover much faster following a 
negative shock in 1973, and would have kept the fishery above a threshold point below which 
the actual fishery fell in the early 1990s. The H-resilience associated with a  reserve also has 
important implications for other fisheries, especially in Europe, that are explicitly managed to 
ensure that the spawning stock biomass (SSB) is kept above a precautionary level (SSBpa), 
and where every effort is made to ensure the biomass does not fall below an even lower limit 
(SSBlim).7  
Second, some of the economic concerns by fishers about marine reserves, at least for the 
northern cod fishery, are misplaced. We show that a marine reserve generates substantial 
economic benefits to fishers, even with optimal harvesting, in the form of increased resource 
rent and also reduces the variance of both the population and the harvest. In the case of the 
northern cod fishery where many harvesters have low incomes and there exist few 
employment opportunities beyond fishing related activities (Department of Fisheries and 
Ocean, 2004b), such income ‘smoothing’ by reserves can be very valuable. The implication of 
our findings for resource managers is that appropriately sized reserves are able to generate 
economic payoffs to fishers while also providing some protection against management 
mistakes and environmental stochasticity.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
The management of renewable resources is governed by irreducible uncertainties. 
Managers and regulators have either ignored environmental variation in their decision-making 
or addressed uncertainty in a certainty-equivalent approach by employing ‘conservative’ rates 
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of exploitation. Using data from the northern cod fishery of Atlantic Canada that suffered one 
of the twentieth centuries most spectacular resource collapses, we examine the economic 
value of a marine reserve with a stochastic optimal control model. 
We find that a marine reserve with either optimal harvesting, or with the harvesting rule 
that the regulator attempted to use in the fishery, would have kept the biomass at much higher 
levels and reduced the risk of the stock collapse that occurred in the early 1990s. Our 
simulations also indicate that the economic value of a marine reserve and optimal harvesting 
in terms of cumulative resource rent over the period 1962-1991, relative to the actual harvest, 
is worth almost $2 billion. We also generate a counter intuitive result, namely, that even with 
optimal harvesting a reserve generates an extra payoff to fishers worth $162 million. This 
extra benefit with a reserve, even when harvesting is optimal, arises because a reserve allows 
for a spillover of fish and a higher harvest after a negative shock, although the trade off is a 
lower harvest in the absence of a negative shock  
We also find that if the regulator had been able to successfully implement its desired, but 
suboptimal, harvesting rule then the economic value of the reserve would have been worth 
some $374 million. In addition to providing direct economic benefits to fishers, a marine 
reserve provides a ‘smoothing’ function for resource rents that is of considerable benefit to 
those who may have few employment options outside of their industry. 
 Our bioeconomic model shows that with environmental variability an optimal-sized 
marine reserve offers the possibility of a ‘win-win-win’ ― it can increase the resource rent, 
reduce the recovery time of a population to return to its former state after a negative shock, 
and lower the risk of catastrophic collapse. Given the very large natural fluctuations in marine 
populations and the propensity of managers to make errors with such uncertainties, marine 
reserves appear to offer a valuable, but underutilized, tool for resource management.  
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Table 1: Actual and optimum harvest with optimum reserve (millions of tons). 
Year (1) 
Actual 
Exploitable 
biomass 
(2) 
Actual harvest 
(3) 
Optimum 
biomass 
(4) 
Optimum 
harvest  
  1962 2.977 0.503 2.977 0.85309121 
  1963 2.655 0.509 2.42347432 0.37350931 
  1964 2.541 0.603 2.47517002 0.40391219 
  1965 2.39 0.545 2.60979768 0.49069243 
  1966 2.336 0.525 2.37307641 0.35091683 
  1967 2.382 0.612 2.40202432 0.36530523 
  1968 2.329 0.81 2.59490323 0.4790063 
  1969 2.006 0.754 2.56659628 0.46001592 
  1970 1.693 0.52 2.61925004 0.49564353 
  1971 1.601 0.44 2.61842344 0.49522417 
  1972 1.394 0.458 2.54388726 0.4443343 
  1973 0.983 0.355 2.10377814 0.24296733 
  1974 0.752 0.373 2.44857247 0.38857491 
  1975 0.568 0.288 2.13681133 0.27116593 
  1976 0.526 0.214 2.33601211 0.33528629 
  1977 0.526 0.173 2.27663654 0.31169336 
  1978 0.597 0.139 2.31584134 0.32562431 
  1979 0.695 0.167 2.24265689 0.29957699 
  1980 0.781 0.178 2.35903646 0.34533376 
  1981 0.882 0.171 2.39559685 0.36233135 
  1982 0.931 0.23 2.56969681 0.46146337 
  1983 1.007 0.232 2.52018798 0.43114364 
  1984 1.125 0.232 2.42224303 0.37392935 
  1985 1.06 0.231 2.54156966 0.44430831 
  1986 0.951 0.252 2.70627668 0.56275807 
  1987 0.812 0.235 2.31906297 0.32721533 
  1988 0.699 0.269 2.21147028 0.2901883 
  1989 0.569 0.253 2.37187835 0.3500142 
  1990 0.405 0.219 2.24827366 0.30152929 
  1991 0.242 0.171 2.60424519 0.48559519 
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Table 2: Cumulative net gain in resource rent (billions of 1991 Canadian dollars). 
Year 
(1) 
Optimum 
harvest & 
40% reserve 
Vs. 
actual harvest 
(2) 
Optimum 
harvest & 
40% reserve 
Vs. 
optimum 
harvest & no 
reserve 
 
(3) 
Optimum 
harvest & 
40% reserve 
Vs. 
20% harvest 
rule & no 
reserve
(4) 
Optimum 
harvest & 
40% reserve 
Vs. 
20% harvest 
rule & 40%
reserve
 actual harvest
(5) 
20% harvest 
rule & no 
reserve 
Vs. 
(6) 
20% harvest 
rule and 40% 
reserve
Vs. 
actual harvest
(7)
20% harvest 
rule & 40% 
reserve
Vs.
20% harvest 
rule & no 
reserve
1962 0.300 0.025 0.214 0.214 0.086 0.086 0.000
1963 0.159 0.017 0.096 0.104 0.063 0.055 -0.008
1964 -0.012 0.009 0.025 0.041 -0.038 -0.053 -0.015
1965 -0.048 0.006 0.025 0.048 -0.073 -0.096 -0.022
1966 -0.183 -0.001 -0.039 -0.006 -0.145 -0.174 -0.029
1967 -0.361 -0.004 -0.078 -0.039 -0.283 -0.322 -0.039
1968 -0.551 -0.007 -0.053 -0.005 -0.498 -0.543 -0.045
1969 -0.683 -0.013 -0.038 0.016 -0.645 -0.698 -0.054
1970 -0.644 -0.019 -0.019 0.044 -0.625 -0.684 -0.059
1971 -0.556 -0.024 0.000 0.067 -0.556 -0.623 -0.067
1972 -0.491 -0.029 -0.003 0.070 -0.488 -0.563 -0.074
1973 -0.481 -0.048 -0.041 -0.012 -0.440 -0.469 -0.029
1974 -0.316 0.025 -0.002 -0.032 -0.314 -0.283 0.030
1975 -0.165 0.038 0.002 -0.074 -0.167 -0.091 0.076
1976 0.034 0.080 0.035 -0.080 -0.003 0.115 0.118
1977 0.212 0.107 0.067 -0.084 0.143 0.297 0.154
1978 0.380 0.130 0.103 -0.080 0.277 0.461 0.184
1979 0.508 0.141 0.132 -0.079 0.376 0.587 0.211
1980 0.639 0.155 0.176 -0.058 0.463 0.698 0.235
1981 0.767 0.164 0.228 -0.029 0.540 0.796 0.256
1982 0.908 0.171 0.301 0.026 0.607 0.882 0.276
1983 1.024 0.172 0.363 0.070 0.661 0.955 0.294
1984 1.109 0.172 0.401 0.094 0.706 1.015 0.309
1985 1.216 0.172 0.456 0.134 0.760 1.082 0.323
1986 1.356 0.169 0.530 0.195 0.826 1.163 0.337
1987 1.432 0.168 0.548 0.203 0.885 1.230 0.346
1988 1.499 0.166 0.562 0.208 0.937 1.291 0.354
1989 1.601 0.165 0.589 0.227 1.013 1.375 0.362
1990 1.718 0.164 0.606 0.239 1.111 1.480 0.368
1991 1.930 0.162 0.655 0.282 1.274 1.649 0.374
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Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis of Optimal Reserve Size and Resource Rent 
 
Optimum reserve size 
(proportion of total 
biomass)  
Discounted net gain with 
optimum harvest and 
reserve size Vs. actual 
(billions CDN 1991 dollars)
Discounted net gain with 
optimum harvest and 
reserve size Vs. optimum 
harvest with no reserve 
(billions CDN 1991 dollars)
 Transfer coefficient 
Growth coefficient 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.23 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.84 0.87 0.90 0.93 0.20 0.23 0.26 0.29
0.27 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 1.79 1.91 1.93 1.95 0.04 0.16 0.18 0.20
0.31 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 2.83 2.88 2.94 2.95 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.15
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End Notes: 
                                                 
1 Further details and diagnostics of the estimated growth function are available from the authors. 
2 A list of the mix, scale and absolute dissimilarity scores for each year are available from the authors. 
3 Figures of the effects and value of a reserve assuming equal shocks are available from the authors upon request. 
As with the unequal shock case, a reserve generates a positive economic value relative to the actual harvest that 
took place, but also with optimal harvesting. 
4 All $ values are in 1991 Canadian dollars. 
5 The estimates we use for the exploitable biomass come from a series that corrects for past inaccuracies. 
6 Sumaila (1998) and Mangel (1998) show an inverse relationship between reserve size and the size of negative 
shocks in a fishery. Doyen and Béné (2003) also find that the greater the level of uncertainty (size and/or 
probability of a negative shock), the greater the share of the population required in a reserve to maintain a 
minimum viable population. 
7 Despite the use of both total harvest and effort controls the North Sea, the Irish Sea and West of  Scotland cod 
stocks all remain below their respective SSBlim. 
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Figure 1: The difference in harvest between the case of optimum harvest with a 40%
reserve and optimum harvest with no reserve
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Figure 2: Relationship between the actual harvest and optimum harvest with 40%
reserve
–1
–0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 n
et
 h
ar
ve
st
in
g 
ga
in
 (m
illio
ns
 of
 to
ns
)
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Time
Figure 3: Cumulative net harvesting gain (millions of tons) from optimal harvesting
and 40% reserve versus actual harvest.
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Figure 4: Discounted cumulative resource rent (billions of dollars) from optimal
harvesting and 40% reserve versus actual harvest.
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Figure 5: Discounted cumulative resource rent (billions of dollars) from optimal
harvesting and a 40% reserve size versus a 20% harvest rule with no reserve.
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Figure 6: Biomass with optimum harvest with a 40% reserve, a 20% harvest rule
with a 40% reserve, and actual biomass
